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Semiconductor chips: because of their strategic importance, they
have been called "the 'crude oil' of industry today."1 Semiconduc-
tors are used not only in computers and military devices but also in
consumer products such as video games and microwave ovens.
Their small size and vast memory capacity render them the essential
element in the latest electronic equipment.
Traditional national laws and international conventions regarding
intellectual property fell short of providing the protection this new
industry demanded. The United States addressed this problem by
enacting a sui generis2 form of protection, which included special
provisions to encourage other nations to conform with the U.S.
laws.3 The result has been de facto international harmonization of
laws regarding these devices. Multilateral attempts to unify semi-
conductor chip protection laws, however, have not been as
successful.
Part I of this Note will give an overview of some special legal
considerations which semiconductor chip ("chip") protection en-
tails. Part H" will explain the unilateral actions and bilateral agree-
ments which have initiated the harmonization process. Part I takes
up the failures of multilateral conventions to achieve unification of
laws or even consensus in this area. Part IV assesses the current
state of negotiations in the wake of the failed conventions. Finally,
Part V presents an analysis of these problems and suggests a method
by which unification of laws might be attained.
1. Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Zentaro Kitagawa, Legal Protection of Integrated Cir-
cuit Layout. Birth of a New Intellectual Property, 114 ARcurv mUR URmmER-, FMm-,
Fuzm-, uwi TuzTvtrxcwT (ARcs. URmms. FFTR.) 59, 60 (1990).
2. Black's defines sui generis as, "of its own kind or class; i.e. the only one of
its own dnd." BucK's LAw DicrioNARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990). I will use the term in
this sense to indicate that the type of protection enacted is unique and does not fit
within traditional schemes of protection. In addition, for the purposes of this paper,
I use the term to indicate that the law conforms to the special provisions analogous
to those in U.S. law (i.e. the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984). See infra
note 32 and accompanying text.
3. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 901-914 (Law.
Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1992).
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I. OVERVIEW
The protection of rights associated with chips4 is a politically
charged topic. Because chips are essential for military use and are a
high-technology item, many nations want to maintain access to the
technology. The most technologically advanced nations strive to
have their own nationals in the forefront of the research. In addi-
tion, there are powerful private interests in this industry (e.g. the
U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association ("SIA") or the Japanese
Semiconductor Industry Association) which wield great influence
over political leaders. Moreover, in this industry, both dumping and
antitrust actions have been brought before the Secretariat of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and also before
the International Trade Commission ("ITC").s Space constraints
prohibit these topics from being included here, only 'the unification
of the intellectual property protection will be covered. Note, how-
ever, that against this backdrop, the nations' negotiating strategies
make more sense.
Finally, the difference between "harmonization" and "unification"
should be kept in mind. Harmonization entails integration of sepa-
rate, existing, legal schemes or cooperation between enforcement
bodies, in order to expedite the enforcement of the separate
schemes. Unification, on the other hand, involves agreement upon a
single text. There exists a world of difference between these two
processes, some of which will be explored herein.
A. Inapplicability of Traditional Forms of Intellectual
Property Protection
Unfortunately, the traditional methods of protecting intellectual
property; copyright, trademark, and patent, have not proved capa-
ble of protecting chips. This deficiency served as impetus to estab-
lish a form of protection which was outside of the established
intellectual property conventions.
4. A semiconductor chip is a thin slice of silicon, a material whose electrical
conductivity is easily changed by minute amounts of substances on its surface. DEN-
ms LoNa-Ey & MicHAEL SnH.i, DI=CONIMY OF INFoRmTo TEcHNoLooY 303 (2nd ed.
1986). The chip is etched with layers of circuit layouts (these layers are often
called "mask works"). Jonathan H. Lemberg, Semiconductor Protection: Foreign
Responses to a U.S. Initiative, 25 COLUM. 1. TRA sNAT'L. L. 345, 346 (1987). The
finished product serves to store a great amount of information on a relatively small
surface.
5. Antidumping Order, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,781 (1986); Japan - Trade in Semi-
conductors, GATT Doc.L/6309 (March 14, 1988) (GATT Dispute Settlement Panel
Report, derestricted August 22, 1988 (INF/240)). "Dumping" refers to the practice
of one nation underpricing its goods in order to gain market share in another coun-
try. Generally nations do not want foreign goods flooding their internal markets
even though consumers may benefit from lower prices.
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The rationale behind protecting intellectual property is that crea-
tivity will be encouraged, and new inventions will be generated, if
an inventor is assured that others will not be able to copy her inven-
tion without remunerating her, or without her permission. The sta-
bility created thereby, will also encourage businesses to invest in
this type of research without fear of losing their investments to copi-
ers. It often takes an enormous investment to invent something cov-
ered by intellectual property laws, but it is relatively cheap to copy.
Unfortunately, the traditional categories of intellectual property
protection can not be easily applied to the semiconductor industry.
Trademark laws protect observable "words, names, symbols and de-
vices that distinguish goods and services from other, similar goods
and services."'6 Because chips are integrated into the internal mech-
anisms of other products, this type of protection is meaningless for
chips. Patent law which grants property rights to "new, useful, and
nonobvious processes and products"17 might appear capable of pro-
viding adequate protection. The circuit layout itself, however, is the
component which requires protection. This layout is usually in-
vented as a result of application of established rules of mathematics.
As a result, the chip designs do not usually fulfill patent law require-
ments of "novelty" or "inventive step,"8 necessary before the inven-
tion will be protected.
Finally, copyright law which protects "original expression" but
not the ideas which the creator expresses,9 might seem capable of
providing intellectual property protection for chips. This, however,
remains a debated proposition. As a practical matter, copyright pro-
tection has not usually been extended to this industry because doing
so would risk an over-broad application of the theory of copyright
protection. It is feared that too many products (such as blenders or
even tractors) would then fall under the aegis of copyright law.
Moreover, the nature of the chip industry is such that the twenty year
period of protection provided by most copyright laws, is too long to
serve the needs of this rapidly-changing industry. 10 These difficul-
ties render established forms of intellectual property protection in-
adequate to protect chips. Thus the traditional international
conventions (Berne Convention, Paris Convention),11 which encom-
6. Marshall A. Leafier, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REV. 273, 279 n.30 (1991).
7. Id. at 279 n.31.
8. Kitagawa, supra note 1, at 61.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
10. Kitagawa, supra note 1, at 61.
11. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work, as last
revised, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised, July'14, 1967,
U.S.T 1583 [hereinafter P._ris Convention].
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pass these forms of intellectual property protection on an interna-
tional scale, were equally inadequate for the chip industry.
B. Considerations Unique to Chip Protection
There exist further complications which render traditional forms
of intellectual property protection inappropriate for chip protection.
Certain practices are unique to the semiconductor industry. First,
chip manufacturers often engage in "reverse engineering." 12 Man-
ufacturers in the United States consider this right crucial, since it
avoids the (often strategic) risk of depending on only one supplier."3
Reverse engineering must be distinguished from "chip piracy"
which entails direct copying. This distinction is often fuzzy."4 It
would be impossible to introduce the concept of reverse engineer-
ing into traditional intellectual property protection schemes without
drastically altering them. Again, adequate chip protection calls for
an entirely new scheme.
Another idiosyncrasy of the semiconductor industry is that some
nations do not take offense to "innocent infringement." An "inno-
cent infringement" provision stipulates that if a producer is unaware
that it is importing or distributing a chip which has been pirated, it
incurs no further liability than paying reasonable royalties."5 This
legal structure is beneficial in that it encourages wide distribution of
the chips. In sum, the special practices inherent in the chip industry
place the intellectual property protection that the chips require,
outside of traditional forms of protection.
C. International Considerations for Chip Protection
Although intellectual property is regulated by both the Berne
Convention 16 and the Paris Convention, 17 both of which are admin-
istered by the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"),' 8 the protection these conventions offer is considered in-
adequate by many nations because they specify very low iium
12. Reverse engineering is the practice by which a manufacturer examines a
competitor's circuits and then designs a new "improved" chip which performs the
same function but with a different design. Lemberg, supra note 4, at 351.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983: Hearings on S.
1201 Before the Sub-comm. on Patents, Copyrigqts and Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1983); Lemberg, supra note 4, at
351 n.50. "If the Russians do it its piracy.. if an American does it, it is reverse
engineering."
15. 17 U.S.C.S. § 907 (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1992).
16. Berne Convention, supra note 11.
17. Paris Convention, supra note 11.
18. World Intellectual Property Organization, General Information, WIPO Pub.
lication No. 401 (E) at 14 (1988).
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standards and lack enforcement capabilities.' 9 Furthermore,
although the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks is currently negoti-
ating agreements on intellectual property, no resolution has yet
been reached. 20 These conventions, and their capabilities of pro-
viding adequate chip protection, will be dealt with in Part III of this
Note.
Another international consideration which arises within the chip
industry is a notion which is not known in American law: "compul-
sory licensing. "21 In some countries, after an inventor is paid a one-
time, statutorily set fee, there are no further constraints on distribu-
tion of the product.2 2 A problem often encountered under this
scheme is that the fees are set too low for the inventor to recoup her
investment. The result is a "de facto expropriation" of the intellec-
tual property protection. 23 Compulsory licensing is favored by
lesser developed countries ("LDCs")24 who believe multinational
companies use their monopoly powers to exploit the LDC citizens.25
These countries also believe that they should be given easy access
to technology, notwithstanding their frequent inability to provide
ongoing intellectual property protection. They also assert that a
one-time fee is easier to administer.26
This raises a more general grievance of LDCs regarding harmoni-
zation of their laws to conform with those of the developed countries
("DCs").27 Intellectual property laws presuppose substantial infra-
structure in an enforcing country such as: competent legal process
and enforcement abilities; and a body of enforcement personnel
with sufficient technical knowledge to recognize violations. LDCs
19. See INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1-14 (Marshall A. Leaf-
far ed. 1990).
20. William Dullforce, GATT; Cautious Optimism for Trade Talks Break-
through, Fni. Tnas, Oct. 25, 1991, § 1, at 6.
21. Although the term "compulsory licensing" exists in U.S. law, it refers to a
provision of copyright law which prohibits an author from blocking the use of his
copyrighted work, provided that certain formalities are complied with, and the stat-
utory royalty rate is paid. 17 U.S.C. § 115. In other countries the same term is used
differently. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
22. Leafier, supra note 6, at 285.
23. Id. at 285 n.5.
24. This is a nebulous categorization. I will use the acronym to refer to countries
that have not had a substantial start into industrialization i.e. most of South America,
and Africa. This category does not include the so-called "NICS" which are pre-
industrial economies. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
25. Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating
Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MxcH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1361
n.164 (Summer 1990) (noted in Vaitsos, Patents Revisited: Their Function in Devel-
oping Countries, 1972 J. DEv. SUn. 71, 85-86 (1972)) (quoting data from an official
study from the Instituto de Comercio Exterior of the Colombian Government).
26. Leafier, supra note 6, at 281.
27. I will use this acronym to refer to the already industrialized countries such as
EC members, the U.S. and Japan.
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have argued that these do not exist in their countries.28 Further-
more, the costs imposed on LDC governments' budgets to establish
such an administration, which appears only to exist for the protec-
tion of foreigners' intellectual property rights, are often prohibitive
especially in light of the immediate, though short-term, profits which
are produced by chip piracy. In addition, the DCs' promises of
long-term benefits of increased access to high technology seem
vague and uncertain.29 Moreover, some LDC leaders "are reluctant
to appear to respond positively to pressure from the U.S.""s since
they do not want to appear to cowtow to DCs' interests. Finally, a
constant impediment to any international efforts at consolidation of
laws is the problem of sovereignty. Most nations, especially those
whose sovereignty has been recently won, strongly resist what they
view as an attempt to usurp their power. All of the above factors
make LDCs reluctant to cooperate in any harmonization efforts espe-
cially if the methods employed by the DCs are heavy-handed.
Thus LDCs are quite rational in their reluctance, based on both
economic and political reasoning, to enforce DCs' intellectual prop-
erty rights or cooperate in harmonization of laws. The result is that
many LDCs either refuse to protect intellectual property or, if they
actually enact legislation, they will enforce it poorly if at all.
A final international consideration crucial to the chip industry in-
volves the concept of "national treatment." This concept is a basic
tenet of some multinational agreements such as the GATT and the
Berne Convention,"1 and it entails treating another state's product
(or enterprise) on an equal footing with its domestic equivalent as
soon as it attains customs clearance. Although these agreements
may work well for goods, once again, the chip industry's unique
structure renders these types of agreements inadequate to provide
the intellectual property protection necessary to allow harmoniza-
tion efforts to proceed.
DCs generally provide substantial intellectual property protec-
tion. A nation which grants a great deal of protection to its nationals
will be forced to grant this high level of protection to foreigners
while the foreign nation may not provide adequate protection in re-
turn. This situation leads some nations to favor reciprocity agree-
ments for intellectual property, with the result that, although
harmonization may proceed through bilateral agreements, unifica-
tion efforts through multilateral agreements are thwarted.
28. Leafier, supra note 6, at 280.
29. Leafier, supra note 6, at 282 n.42.
30. INTELLEc'iAL PROPERTY R oH-s: GLOBA CONSENSUS, GLOBAL ComucT? 17 n.19
(R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) [hereinafter Gadbaw &
Richards].
31. See Berne Convention, supra note 11; GimuR AoeubmT ON TAEw AND
TRADE, pt. II, art. III [hereinafter GATT Treaty].
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This is the international situation regarding the enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights. The nature of the chip industry, the op-
posing objectives of the interested parties, the inadequacy of the
existing forms of protection, and the corresponding international
conventions, all work against unification of laws. Harmonization ef-
forts may be more successful.
II. UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL ACTIONS
Out of fear of inadequate protection due to all of the above rea-
sons, and in response.to pressure from the SIA, impetus developed
in the United States to establish entirely new laws regarding chip
protection.
A. The Semiconductor Ch2ip Protection Act
In 1984, the United States enacted the Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act ("SCPA").3 2 This act provides protection upon registra-
tion of a mask work design,3 3 additionally, it condones reverse
engineering s 4 and innocent infringement.3s The act, however, con-
demns compulsory licensing. 6 What is interesting about this law it
that it includes both a reciprocity clause3 7 ("§ 902"), and a "transi-
tional provision" ("§ 914"),31 which together are designed to en-
courage other countries to enact legislation in conformance with the
United States law.3 9
Section 902 (the reciprocity clause) provides two ways for a na-
tion to receive United States protection for its chips. First, the nation
may be a party to a chip treaty.40 This is a forward-looking clause
since there are as yet no such treaties. Second, if the President of
the United States finds that the nation extends chip protection to
United States nationals or domiciliaries "on substantially the same
basis as provided in this [statute]," 4 1 then that nation will be granted
the same level of protection the United States grants its own nation-
als. This provision seeks harmonization (albeit based on the argua-
bly self-interested terms of the United States) by encouraging others
32. SCPA, supra note 3.
33. 17 U.S.C.S. § 902 (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1992).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 906; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 907.
36. 17 U.S.C § 913; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 902 (a)(2): "The President may revise, suspend, or revoke any
such proclamation or impose any conditions or limitations on protection. ..
38. 17 U.S.C. § 914.
39. Explanatory Memo of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 6163 Title I as Con-
sidered by the House of Representatives, 130 CoNo. REc. E4432 (daily ed. Oct. 10,
1984).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1992).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1992).
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to extend the same type of protection the United States provides, by
offering the "carrots" of strong United States intellectual property
protection, and access to the United States' market.
Note that the petitioning nation's chip law need not necessarily
take the sui generis approach. The Commissioner of Patents in a
report issued in 1986 regarded the "Essential elements of compati-
bility" to be that: 1) chips are a protected entity; 2) reverse engi-
neering is allowed; 3) there is a ten year protection period; and 4)
compulsory licensing is very limited.42 Thus in very specific and
certain terms the United States unilaterally established standards of
chip protection which it considered adequate and vigorously sought
international conformance with the United States plan.
In addition, as an alternative to this permanent form of protection,
Congress added § 914 which provides that the Secretary of Com-
merce may extend protection to citizens of a foreign nation if (upon
petition of anyone or sua sponte) the secretary finds:
(1) that the foreign nation is making good faith efforts and reason-
able progress toward -
(A) entering into a treaty described in section 902(a)(1)(A); or
(B)... or section 902(a)(2); and
(2) that the nationals, domiciliaries, and sovereign authorities of
the foreign nation, and persons controlled by them, are not en-
gaged in the misappropriation, or unauthorized distribution or
commercial exploitation, of mask works; and
(3) that issuing the order would promote the purposes of this
chapter and international comity with respect to the protection of
mask works.43
Through these two devices, the United States laid out very spe-
cific guidelines by which bilateral agreements may be negotiated.
Note however, that the overall goal of making a multilateral treaty
is emphasized in the text of (1) and (3). Additionally, this goal is
evidenced by the temporary nature of protection under § 914. The
provision was originally scheduled to expire on November 8,
1987.44 The necessity for periodic renewals emphasizes to the
United States legislators, and the foreigners seeking protection, that
a multilateral agreement has not yet been reached. This is also in-
tended to encourage treaty-making. On the other hand, since this
provision was written by one of the two dominant players in the in-
dustry,4 s it may appear dictatorial. In any case, due to the success
42. AssISTAN SECRETARY AND CoMM'R OF PAT. AND TPD m CONSULTATION
WITH THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTs, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSi-
TIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE SrmacONDucTOR CHIP PRoTEcTION AcT OF 1984 42-43 (Nov. 7,
1986) (summarized in 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA) 51 (Nov. 20, 1986))
[hereinafter Report on Transitional Provisions].
43. 17 U.S.C. § 914 (a)(1)-(3) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1992).
44. Id.
45. By 1989, the U.S. and Japan combined controlled about 80% of the chip
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of the bilateral agreements reached, and the failure to make a
treaty, this "transitional provision" has been extended twice. It is
now scheduled to "sunset" July 1, 1994.46
The joint United States-Japanese dominance in the chip industry is
illustrated by the legislative history of the Act. In fact, the transi-
tional provision was suggested to United States Senator Charles
McC. Mathias and United States Representative Robert W. Kas-
tenmeier by Akio Morita, Chairman of Sony Corporation, and then
President of the Electronic Industries Association of Japan. Morita
wrote, that the SCPA:
will serve as a model for other countries .... In this respect we
feel it would be very beneficial for such legislation to maintain an
incentive for foreign nations to 'catch up'.... This could be ac-
complished by a reasonable interim period for full-term registra-
tion .... (emphasis added)4 7
Congress decided to adopt the suggestion of this powerful and
often adversarial, foreign industrial interest, to set up a model law.
In addition, Congress agreed that a transitional period would en-
courage countries "either to enact chip protection laws.., or to
conclude an international treaty." 48 Agreement between the two
countries which dominate the market makes opposition to the stan-
dards they set, a proposition analogous to the story of "David and
Goliath."
As expected, some of the procedural aspects of the SCPA pro-
moted harmonization of chip laws. On November 7, 1984, the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office issued "Guidelines for the Submission of
Applications for Interim Protection of Mask Works Under 17 U.S.C.§ 914."49 This report specified the procedures and information re-
quired to obtain protection in the United States, as well as provisions
for public hearings and commentary. Among other things, a peti-
tioner may be required to submit statements from a foreign govern-
ment regarding legislative efforts and progress in the area of chip
protection, including bills, proposals, correspondence, executive
proclamations, and regulations. Additionally, the government must
submit evidence that its nationals are not chip pirates.50 This proce-
industry. See U.S., Japan Refuse to Sign WIPO Treaty on Protection of Semicon-
ductor Chips, 38 Pat. Trademark & Copyright. J. (BNA) 123 (June 1, 1989) [herein-
after U.S., Japan Refuse].
46. 17 U.S.C. § 914 (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1992).
47. Jay A. Erstling, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act and Its Impact on
the International Protection of Chip Designs, 15 RuRoERs CoMPuTER & TECH. L.J.
303, 316 (1989) quoting Letters from Akio Morita to Senator Charles McC. Mathias
and Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, July 18, 1984 (copy on file with Mr.
Erstling).
48. Report on Transitional Provisions, supra note 42, at 2.
49. 49 Fed. Reg. 44517 (1984).
50. Id. at 4518.
1'992]
146 Entertainment, Media & Intellectual Property Law Forum [Vol. 2
dure raises two issues regarding unification of laws. First, under
these guidelines, a United States agency is demanding access to for-
eign governments' documents in order to evaluate and criticize for-
eign legislation (and even their proposals) and its application. The
United States thereby obtains a substantial and often unwelcome in-
fluence in both the promulgation, and the substance, of foreign
laws. Not surprisingly, this has caused some consternation over-
seas.-" The traditional objections to international usurpation of sov-
ereignty certainly are apropos here. A second issue involves the
time period provided for public comment before the Commissioner
takes any actionYs 2 This procedure might encourage the harmoniza-
tion of laws by increasing the viewpoints at hand. The procedure
encourages creative solutions by allowing interested private parties
and third countries to influence decisions on chip protection. On
the other hand, more voices may make consensus harder to reach.
Nonetheless, this procedure assures that all parties are aware of the
situation at hand. Once again, although heavy handed, the SCPA
serves to encourage harmonization.
B. Bilateral Responses to the SCPA
Notwithstanding its imperialistic characteristics, the SCPA has
had a profound harmonizing impact among the DCs. As one of the
two most powerful nations in the chip industry, Japan was the first to
file for § 914 protection. 3 The petition was based on the Japanese
"Act on the Circuit Layout of a Semiconductor Integrated Cir-
cuit,"5 4 a sui generis type of intellectual property protection which
was made in response to the SCPA.
There are only a few differences between the Japanese act and
the SCPA. For example, Japanese sanctions for violations may in-
clude criminal penalties,55 and there are differences in the terminol-
ogy and the administrative structure for registration. S6  As a
practical matter, however, the Secretary of Commerce concluded
that the act provided protection in the four areas required by the
United States and therefore granted interim protection under
§ 914. s '
Eighteen other countries followed suit and were granted interim
protection. To date, the nineteen countries which enjoy interim pro-
51. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 30, at 49.
52. Report on Transitional Provisions, supra note 42, at 9.
53. 50 Fed. Reg. 12,355 (1985).
54. Act on the Circuit Layout of a Semiconductor Integrated Circuit, Law No.
43, 1985. In English: Industrial Property Laws and Treaties, Japan, 25 INDus. PRoP.
TExT 1-001 (Sept. 1985).
55. Id. at ch. 6.
56. Id. at acts 28-46.
57. 50 Fed. Reg. 12,355 (1985).
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tection are: Austria, Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, Sweden,
Switzerland and the twelve members of the European Community("%EC"#).sa
It is clear that the SCPA does specifically require a sui generis
approach. As an illustration, Australia and the United Kingdom
were initially granted interim protection even though they lacked
sui generis laws for chips in their legislation. Their petitions
claimed that protection for chips was provided under their copy-
right laws.s9 The Commissioner of Patents decided to grant tempo-
rary protection for pragmatic reasons:
There is no requirement that the two nation's [sic] laws be the
same, or for that matter, even similar .... International comity
- mutual respect for the laws of other States - can be best pro-
moted by acknowledging the statement of another government
that their laws provide mask work protection. Harmonization of
those laws can be a continuing objective of bilateral discussions
61
Thus, the mechanism provided by § 914 has proved to be a very
practical measure for harmonization of chip protection laws. It is
particularly helpful in forging bilateral agreements, since its tempo-
rary nature provides diplomatic flexibility, and at the same time as-
sures that the Commissioner of Patents and the corresponding
foreign authorities are progressing in their harmonization efforts. By
applying § 914 "loosely," the Commissioner may give some nations
the benefit of the doubt, and thereby avoid impeding trade.
However, as demonstrated by EC's chip protection negotiations
with the United States, the sui generis approach works best within
the United States designed apparatus for harmonization. Although
some of the EC countries had negotiated individually with the
United States, in 1985 the United States granted the EC § 914 pro-
tection6 2 based on the then-proposed Council Directive.6" Section
914 established a sui generis scheme of protection but also allowed
for the possibility of extending copyright laws to chip protection.
An EC directive (as opposed to a regulation which applies as writ-
58. Austria, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,351 (1989); Australia, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,818
(1985); Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,649 (1985); Finland, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,127
(1987); Japan 50 Fed. Reg. 12,355 (1985); Sweden, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,618 (1985);
Switzerland, 52 Fed. Reg. 12,445 (1987); European Community, 50 Fed. Reg.
26,821 (1985).
59. Interim Protection for Mask Works of Nationals, Domiciliaries and Sover-
eign Authorities of Australia, the United Kingdom, Great Britain & Northern Ire-
land, & the Netherlands, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,818 (1985).
60. Report on Transitional Provisions, supra note 42, at 16.
61. Id. at 19.
62. 50 Fed. Reg. 26,821 (1985).
63. Council Directive of 16 December 1986 on the Legal Protection of Topog-
raphies of Semiconductor Products, 1987 O.1. (L 24).
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ten), gives the member states leeway to decide how to make their
own laws conform to the specific goals demanded by the direc-
tive.14 Notwithstanding the flexibility of this structure, all the mem-
ber states eventually chose the sui generis approach - albeit
grudgingly. Herman Cohen Jehoram, an European intellectual
property professor, in a speech given at the Centre for Intellectual
Property Rights in Leuven, Belgium, indicated that Europeans have
acquiesced in enacting these forms of protection due to interna-
tional pressure and the desire for expediency. He criticized "[t]he
rough American technique of turning the national treatment rule in-
side out in order to pressure other countries into a national protec-
tion system nobody really cares for .. .. e But in the end, he
admitted that although the reasons may have been wrong, the sa
generis approach was the "right solution." 66
In sum, the United States' "carrot and stick" approach has
achieved de facto harmonization of chip protection laws among
most of the DCs. In manufacturing this harmonization, § 914 has
served one of the purposes of the SCPA. The treaty which this act
envisioned as its ultimate success, however, has not even
commenced.
III. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS
It is of course preferable to have a multilateral resolution, be-
cause then the problems engendered by a "patchwork" of regula-
tion schemes can be avoided and standards can be applied
globally. Not only will the United States benefit from a multilateral
treaty, but other countries often favor this sort of agreement because
the negotiations can then be carried on in a neutral arena, where
every member may have a voice in the proceedings. This section
will describe WIPO's efforts and the possibility of GATT governing
intellectual property rights.
The Berne Convention, despite its frequent revisions, proved un-
satisfactory in the protection of chips. Many nations were unsatis-
fied because its intellectual property standards were too low and an
adequate enforcement mechanism was absent from the convention.
In addition, the traditional forms of intellectual property protection
which the Berne Convention encompasses do not address the
problems which are unique to the chip industry. 7 In a similar way,
64. TamTir EsTAL.mBIo T, Eunoriww EcoNowc Com mITy [EEC TacATY] art.
189.
65. Herman Cohen lehoram, Some Curious Problems Caused By Semi-Conduc-
tor Ch2ip Protection: A European View, 36 J. CopyuoHr Soc'Y U.S.A. No. 4, 295,
299 (1989).
66. Id.
67. See supra part I.
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the Universal Copyright Convention68 proved ineffective to protect
chips because it is best applied to literary and artistic works. More-
over, although the United States is a signatory to this convention, it
is administered by the United Nations Economic and Social Council
("UNESCO"), an United Nations subdivision of which the United
States is no longer a member. Thus one of the two major players in
the industry does not adhere to the convention.
A. WIPO's Attempt at Unification
WIPO demonstrated awareness of these deficiencies in existing
forms of chip protection. Starting in 1985, several negotiating ses-
sions were held regarding chip protection, and a first draft of a
treaty was produced in 1987.69 The sessions were adversarial and
many changes were made on this original draft. Ultimately the fifth
version was adopted and opened for signature on May 26, 1989.70
Forty nations voted for the treaty, ironically, the dominant nations in
this industry, the United States and Japan, voted against it and have
refused to sign.71 As it stands, only Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Libe-
ria, Yugoslavia and Zambia have signed the treaty. 2 In the attempt
to reconcile the concerns of both the DCs and the LDCs, no one has
been satisfied.
The first drafts were heavily based on the SCPA and thus met with
DC approval, but due to the objections of some LDCs principally
India, Ghana, and Brazil, (other countries did not object so strongly
- see Part IV infra) many changes were made in favor of the LDCs'
positions before the final draft emerged. The main objections that
the LDCs raised regarding the early drafts were that: 1) since Japan
and the United States enacted their chip protection laws so that they
did not have to submit disputes to an international body, the LDCs
should not be forced to submit to one either - especially if the
body is essentially controlled by the DCs;7s 2) cumpulsory licensing
should be allowed; 3) LDCs should get special treatment; 4) LDC
technology is not advanced enough to benefit from reverse engi-
neering, thus this is not of great importance. 74 These objections re-
flect the classic fear of LDCs that they may be losing some of their
sovereignty by entering such agreements. WIPO responded by
68. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
69. Draft Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of Inte-
grated Circuits, First Session, WIPO Document IPIC/CE/UI/2 (Feb. 12, 1987).
70. Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477 [hereinafter WIPO Treaty].
71. U.S. Japan Refuse, supra note 45.
72. Leaffer, supra note 6, 293 n.96.
73. Tird World Questions the Need for Integrated Circuits Treaty, 34 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 59 (May 21, 1987).
74. Ralph Oman, WIPO Draft Treaty on Chip Protection 37 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 600, 601 (April 6, 1989).
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amending the treaty to provide that disputes would go to the WIPO
assembly. LDCs favored this solution because in the Assembly, de-
cisions are made by the "one nation one vote" procedure and the
LDCs often wield power disproportionate to their economic
strength. Moreover, the treaty was changed to allow signatories to
adopt either a sui generis or a traditional copyright approach." Fi-
nally, other changes were made which are the subject of United
States objections.
The United States objected to the final version of the treaty be-
cause, inter alia: 1) compulsory licensing is allowed; 2) there is no
provision for compensation for innocent infringement; and 3) the
dispute settlement process having been given to the WIPO Assem-
bly is too "politicized."" Basically the DCs fear inadequate en-
forcement and insufficient minimum rights.77 In addition they are
exasperated with the "U.N.-style voting blocs"'7' in WIPO. These
two sets of objections generally reflect the "North-South" schism in
international relations, and are especially reflective of the debate
over international intellectual property (not merely chip) protection
in general. Resolution to this problem involves the entire structure
of world trade and cannot be confined to chip protection issues
alone. One way to begin this resolution process, however, may be
to forge agreements on small subject-areas, such as chip protection.
These agreements may lead to consensus in other areas.
WIPO's quagmire should not indicate that the entire effort has
been a waste. WIPO undertook an effort in 1991 to compose an
entirely new treaty.79 Miguel Angel Emery, an Argentinean dele-
gate to WIPO, indicated that some basic principles have been
agreed upon: first, that some form of intellectual property protec-
tion should be enacted (even in the LDCs); second, that a single text
would serve this purpose the best;80 and third, that a chapter should
be devoted to definitions in order to clarify concepts which might
be foreign to certain legal systems.8 1 As basic as this may seem,
these agreements are essential foundations for further elaboration.
Thus, as the SCPA established the impetus to create multilateral uni-
fication of chip protection laws, WIPO has had success in both es-
tablishing a basis for such an agreement, and in clarifying the LDC
75. WIPO Treaty, supra note 70, at art 4.
76. U.S. Japan Refuse, supra note 45.
77. PTO Announces Extension of Interim Chip Protection Orders, 41 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright 1. (BNA) 107 (1990).
78. Emmert, supra note 25, at 1343.
79. Some Questions Underlying the Draft Model Provisions for Legislation in
the Field of Copyright - A Pragmatic Approach, Copymoar; Mowrimy REvmw op
THE WIPO, September 1990, at 302 [hereinafter Copyow-'r].
80. Id.
81. Id. at 303.
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and DC positions. In Part V of this Note, some possible solutions will
be proposed.
B. GATT's Possible Authority
The unilateral action and bilateral agreements mentioned earlier
in Part II would arguably be in violation of the Most Favored Nation
("MFN") principle of the GATT.8 2 However, to date, the GATT
does not govern intellectual property rights. How and indeed
whether the GATT should govern intellectual property remains
under debate since the Uruguay Round has not yet concluded.
8 3
Many LDCs have argued that GATT overextends its mandate if it
purports to cover intellectual property, and that WIPO is the only
organization competent to handle international intellectual prop-
erty.8 4 This objection is probably caused by the typical LDC wari-
ness of the GATT. Many LDCs see the GATT as a "rich man's club"
which is effectively controlled by DCs, and prefer to deal with
WIPO where their sheer numerical dominance often carries the
day.85
The LDCs criticisms are often on target, however, because the
DCs are frequently the ones who table the proposals and thus set the
agenda. In addition, these proposals are often highly influenced by
industrial lobbying groups in the DCs. This contention is certainly
true with respect to international chip protection. Industrial groups
from different DCs now combine forces to make themselves heard.
The United States sponsored a meeting of "Friends of Intellectual
Property" from March 7 to 11, 1988, at which twenty-two (mostly
industrialized) nations and the EC sent representatives."6 In addi-
tion, in June 1988, a consortium of three industrial associations:
UNICE (a Brussels-based European business association), Keidanren
(from Japan) and the Intellectual Property Committee (a coalition of
thirteen United States corporations) together submitted to the GATT
a suggested framework for intellectual property protection.8 7 Thus,
82. GATT Treaty, supra note 31, at pt. I, art. I. This foundational tenet of the
GATT agreement provides that any preferential trade treatment which is granted
by one signatory to another signatory must be given to all signatories; i.e. once a
member of GATT bestows an advantage on another member, it must accord all
other signatories "no less favorable" treatment.
83. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. at 2 (Sept 20,
1986), available in LEXIS at 25 I.L.M. 1628 (1986).
84. EC Proposal Covers Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 39 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 490, 491 (April 4, 1990).
85. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 30, at 47.
86. Committee Report: Division I-Patents, Richard C. Witte, Chairman, Com-
mittee No. 102-International Patent Treaties and Laws, H. Dieter Hoinkes, Chair-
man, 1988 ABA Sec. Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Rep. 31 (1988).
87. U.S., Japanese, European Groups CaRl for GAT7 Intelectual Property Code,
36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 209 (June 23, 1988).
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a wholly private industrial lobbying group made a proposal to
GATT which received serious consideration. It is remarkable that
the LDCs are heard, let alone capable of stalling negotiation pro-
ceedings with this magnitude of economic power, internationally
consolidated, having the power to set the agenda in opposition to
the LDCs. It remains to be seen whether the LDCs objections will
be given more consideration.
In addition, DCs responded to LDC objections by asserting that
inadequate intellectual property protection and piracy is so detri-
mental to trade that it effectively causes a trade barrier, perhaps a
mightier barrier than that caused by tariffs.88 If this is true, then
GATT is competent to deal with the subject since the intellectual
property protection is "trade-related," and thereby within GATT's
mandate.8 9
Due to both private and public DC pressure, by the start of the
Geneva Meeting in April 1989, the LDCs had finally accepted the
GATT's applicability to intellectual property.90 A subgroup of the
GATT named the "Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights" ("TRIPS") has assumed these responsibilities.91 Thus, the
DC pressure tactics nullified another LDC objection - GATT's
competence to govern intellectual property rights. Again, notwith-
standing arguably heavy-handed tactics by the DCs, another basic
obstacle to unification was overcome. An agreement was made as
to the competent forum for negotiations. Unfortunately, the GATT
negotiations "broke down" at the meeting in Brussels on December
7, 1990, mainly due to disagreement on agricultural issues, how-
ever, some recent reports on the negotiations have been optimis-
tic.9 2 Thus, both GATT and WIPO have made foundational
progress toward unification of chip laws, although both efforts are
effectively stymied at present.
C. Possible Cooperation Between GATT and WEPO
WIPO and GATT are not necessarily mutually exclusive organiza-
tions. In fact, the Directors General of the GATT and WIPO agreed
that GATT could be an appropriate forum for intellectual property
issues.9" It has been suggested that both organizations continue to
88. CopymoHr, supra note 79.
89. India Accepts Principle of Policing Trade-Related Intellectual Property, 3
World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 244-45 (1989).
90. Framework Agreements Adopted April 8, 1989, At Midterm Review of Uru-
guay Round Negotiations Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Ge.
neva, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at 12-13 (April 11, 1989).
91. EC Proposal Covers Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
84.
92. Dulforce, supra note 20.
93. Atlantic Council's Advisory Trade Panel, The Uruguay Round of Multilat-
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do what they do best, and then try to coordinate their efforts.94
WIPO's strength is in its academic expertise in the area of intellec-
tual property. GATT's strength is in its flexible structure (there need
not be unanimity to pass a resolution), its role as a forum for griev-
ances and renegotiations, its dispute settlement mechanism, and the
fact that it is the only set of widely agreed-upon rules for interna-
tional trade. Perhaps most importantly, it possesses enforcement
power through sanctions9" because it is taken seriously by its mem-
bers and it brings together high-level government officials who are
able to bind their nations.96 Additionally, the membership has not
broken down into voting blocks.97 It is not difficult to see how these
two organizations complement each other. The GATT can serve as
the "backbone" structure while WIPO can serve as the "brains."
The delegates to WIPO have the expertise to advise or serve on
GATT dispute resolution panels, indeed already some countries
send the same delegates to both meetings.98 This structure will
avoid a wasteful "turf war" over subject matter, and will allow both
organizations to combine their efforts to achieve unity of laws on
chip protection.
IV. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the wake of the failed multilateral efforts at unification, and
given the de facto harmonization of chip protection laws among the
DCs, very little litigation over chip protection has been instituted.99
As demonstrated by the international consortium of industry which
approached GATT,100 there has been a trend toward inter-firm alli-
ances in the semiconductor industry within10 1 as well as across DC
borders.1 0 2 Impetus for these alliances developed because of the
accord already reached in addition to the industry's trend toward
eral Trade Negotiations: Policy Proposals on Trade and Services 63 (Leddy & Rein-
stein 1987).
94. Emmert, supra note 25 at 1352.
95. Leafier, supra note 6, at 298.
96. Kenneth W. Dam, The Growing Importance of Internaffonal Protection of
Intellectual Property, 21 Imr. LAw. 627, 636-37 (1987). See also Gadbaw & Rich-
ards, supra note 30, at 28.
97. Leafier, supra note 6, at 302.
98. Emmert, supra note 25, at 1376.
99. Robert L. Risberg, Jr., Comment, Five Years Without TIfringement Litigation
Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Unmasking the Spectre of Chip
Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process Technologies, 1990 Wis. L.
REv. 241 (1990).
100. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Peter Burrows, A "Single Industry Voice" Gets Results in Chip
Wars; U.S. Semiconductor Industry Agrees on Unified Goals and Objectives to
Compete With Japanese Trade Practices, 17 Electronic Bus. Copyright (Cahners)
11 (May 6, 1991).
102. See, e.g., Risberg note 99, at 269 n.144,
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highly specialized chips with specific applications. General-pur-
pose, hence profitably copied, chips are no longer the latest tech-
nology.0'0 Thus the market is becoming less conducive to piracy.
In addition, United States chip manufacturers have seen the results
of the collective power they wield, and have evolved into the major
players in the negotiations. A unified approach is increasingly im-
portant given the state of the world economy and the shrinking
United States defense budget upon which both United States and
foreign producers heavily rely. The above factors, combined with
the general clarification of rights under the SCPA, have caused liti-
gation to appear risky and of questionable necessity.
A second trend which has developed is that the so-called "Newly
Industrialized Countries" ("NICs")' °4 have favored stronger intel-
lectual property protection laws.'0 5 Since these countries are at the
beginning stages of industrialization, they can appreciate the bene-
fits of protecting intellectual property and know that if they provide
adequate protection, they will attract foreign capital.
Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Patents continues to extend in-
terim protection, and the United States recently renewed the § 914
authority.10 6 In addition, further bilateral intellectual property ac-
cords providing sui generis chip protection have been reached with
some of the formerly communist countries (such as Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and Bulgaria) and even with Mongolia and Korea.10 7 The
United States is also conducting negotiations individually with Mex-
ico, Thailand, and Yugoslavia.' 08 So, at present, it seems that the
bilateral methods have reached at least a temporary patchwork of
harmonization of chip protection laws.
V. POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS
Multilateral agreement will provide uniform protection and a
long-term solution. In addition, the United States could consolidate
the progress it has made through the bilateral agreements and fulfill
an original objective of the SCPA, i.e. to establish multilateral unifi-
cation of chip laws (a treaty). Moreover, even if the industry is now
103. Id. at 275.
104. I will use this term to mean Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, South
Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico collectively.
105. Dam, supra note 96, at 635.
106. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
107. Treaty Concerning Business and Economic Relations, Mar. 21, 1990, U.S. -
Poland, S. TnsATY Doc. No. 101-18, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990); Agreement on
Trade Relations, Apr. 12, 1990, U.S. - Czechoslovakia, 29 I.L.M. 904 (1990);
Agreement on Trade Relations, January 23, 1991, U.S. - Mongolia, 30 I.L.M. 515(1991); Henrik Hansen, Korean Import Financing and Semiconductor Layout De-
signs, 13 E. Asian Executive Rep. 6 (1991).
108. Copyright Panel Reviews Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Developments,
41 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1023, at 434 (March 21, 1991).
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dominated by the parties who already agree on the sui generis ap-
proach, this does not necessarily mean that LDCs will remain
outside of the market forever. Indeed, this industry may very well
take the same path as other electronic industries and shift its produc-
tion to LDCs. Finally, chip piracy entails international cooperation
(between the pirates and the buyers), thus an international standard
will discourage it. Unification of these laws remains a globally de-
sirable objective.
A standard cannot be forced upon the LDCs, however, regardless
of the economic power behind it. LDCs have realistic limitations in
infrastructure and politics which discourage their acquiescence. 10 9
Their interests must be addressed or no accord will ever be
reached. The DCs will only reap the advantages of consensus if
they make some concessions and give the LDCs some opportunity to
agree without "losing face" at home.
A. General Tactics for Achieving Unification
If DC's truly wish to achieve unification of laws protecting chips,
they must address LDC objections from as many angles'as possible
but meanwhile maintain consistent arguments. The most basic asser-
tion to emphasize is that the benefits of piracy are short term and that
piracy discourages foreign investment in LDC infrastructure.
LDCs respond to this unfocused and theoretical proposition with
the pragmatic objections that they lack the infrastructure to enforce
chip protection. An equally pragmatic solution, however, can be
achieved if the DCs are willing to make an initial investment in the
technological infrastructure of the LDCs. This investment will pay
of in the future in the form of greater protection and possibly lower.
production costs from switching production to the LDCs. The
United States Patent office has recognized this possibility, and as re-
cently as 1987 sent missions to countries (such as Brazil, Egypt, In-
donesia, Iraq, Paraguay, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Turkey, and Venezuela) to train the nationals and to develop local
intellectual property protection programs. 110 This long-term solu-
tion benefits both sides.
Sufficient protection will make DC firms more willing to transfer
their technology to the LDCs who in turn will realize the benefits of
advanced technology. In addition, with a sufficient technological
base, the LDCs should be more willing to accept provisions for re-
verse engineering since they then will posess enough know-how to
reap the benefits of the practice. These suggestions will certainly
109. See supra part I.C.
110. Committee Reports - Debate on Resolution: Special Committees, Summary
of Proceedings of the A.B.A. Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California August 8,
198Z 1987 SEc. PAT. TRADEMARu & COPyGrHT LAW PRoc. 74.
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aid the process of unification because, if the DCs themselves are
willing to take a long-term view, the aid they offer and concessions
they make will allow the LDCs to compromise.
Additionally, if in this spirit both sides will relax their rigid
stances only slightly, it will not harm either one's interests to allow
compulsory licensing only in severely limited circumstances. The
DCs cannot force agreement; although the forceful tactics have es-
tablished the rudiments of conseisus, the final stages call for more
subtle tactics.
B. GATT's Ability to Achieve Unity of Laws
Beyond taking a long-term view and assisting in development ef-
forts, the DCs must utilize the multinational fora available. The
TRIPS negotiations are an appropriate place for the DCs seeking
unification of chip protection laws to continue their efforts.11 As a
caveat, however, chip protection involves concepts different from
traditional intellectual property protection.1 12 Just as a sui generis
approach has worked the best in harmonization, this approach will
probably work best to achieve unification as well.
An often suggested benefit of the GATT framework for negotia-
tions is that since it involves many sectors of trade, larger agree-
ments can be reached by making trade-offs in smaller sectors' 1 3 (i.e.
an agricultural subsidy for a lower tariff on an industrial product).
This does not necessarily help specific negotiations, such as unifica-
tion of chip protection laws. As one United States GATT official put
it "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." 1 4 One of the
main causes of the breakdown of the Uruguay round was the fact
that agriculture - arguably the most controversial topic - was
"linked" to the rest of the round. Therefore, the entire round
"failed" regardless of consensus achieved in other subject-areas. If
a small enough topic is explored, at least some parties are able to
agree and objections can be clearly articulated. Within a small sub-
ject-area, further concessions can be made. Semiconductor agree-
ments are a case in point. "Linking" broad categories merely
complicates negotiations and risks large-scale failure.
This is not to say that a sui generis approach should be adopted in
all cases involving new technologies. That would merely cause
confusion and atomize agreements which have already been
reached. Where already-established rules will suffice, they should
be kept or strengthened.1 1 5 As explained earlier in Part I, adequate
111. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
112. See supra part I.A.
113. Dam, supra note 96, at 636. See also Emmert supra note 25, at 1345.
114. Failure of Gatt Talks Masks Gains in Key Sectors, Bus. IL', December 24,
1990.
115. Accord Lemberg, supra note 4, at 375.
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chip protection is not achieved by any traditional form of intellec-
tual property protection, so a novel approach is appropriate here.
There are several approaches which a GATT chip agreement can
take. The EC in its TRIPS proposal suggested that certain minimum
standards of intellectual property should be observed. 116 Unfortu-
nately, dissatisfaction with this approach under existing conventions
was one of the problems which spurred the adoption of the sui
generis approach to chip protection in the first place.1 17 A second
option is a two-tiered agreement whereby the DCs adhere to a high
standard and the LDCs gradually rise to this standard. This solution
is also unsatisfactory since LDCs may thereby "free-ride," that is,
get the benefits of the agreement without making necessary conces-
sions. Moreover, it is nothing more than a codification of the status
quo "with an agreement to talk again later." 118 Thus, neither of
these proposals resolves the problems of unification within the chip
industry.
A third, and arguably the best, type of agreement is to protect
only signatories, and commit signatories to maintain sufficiently high
standards; but the key difference is to allow compromise by provid-
ing escape clauses for emergencies. Non-signatories are denied the
benefit of the agreed-upon protection. This seems the best overall
approach. In this way, sufficient protection is ensured among signa-
tories, but there is still room for negotiation. In addition, there
should be provisions for ease in amendment, or perhaps for periodic
review. A demonstrated strength of the SCPA was that it necessi-
tated periodic attention and thus, could not fall into disuse or be-
come obsolete. A living, changeable document will best serve the
needs of this rapidly changing industry.
Finally, to reiterate, DCs should make certain their approach is
uniform not only in WIPO and GATT but also regarding their bilat-
eral agreements; otherwise, gains in one forum might undermine
those in another, and the legitimacy of any one agreement may be
questioned. 119 If the above suggestions are followed, a coherent
plan may be maintained.
In sum, there are four basic tools which may be used in achieving
international unification of chip protection laws: 1) the present tac-
tic of bilateral "stick-waving" and threats of limited access to DC
markets; 2) the economic argument of long-term benefits; 3) training
of personnel and development of LDC enforcement infrastructure;
and 4) multilateral efforts at consensus on standards, concessions,
116. Gatt Delegates Receive "Detailed" EC Intellectual Property Proposal, 36
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 278 (July 14, 1988).
117. See supra part I.
118. Emmert, supra note 25, at 1349.
119. Erstling, supra note 47, at 349 n.221.
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and trade-oils. 120 With these in hand, in addition to the progress
made so far, perhaps a global consensus can be achieved.
CONCLUSION
Although the SCPA has been criticized as a typical United States
bullying device, the bilateral agreements reached via its transition
clause have resulted in the harmonization of chip protection laws in
the DCs. Meanwhile, multilateral efforts, although presently stalled,
have nonetheless achieved agreement on foundational issues.
Moreover, many nations are now realizing the benefits of intellec-
tual property protection. What is needed now is a final effort to con-
solidate these gains and establish agreement. Unification of laws on
semiconductor chips is a realistic possibility.
Kim Feuerstein
120. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 30, at 20.
